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Abstract
Much research has been conducted arguing that tipping points at
which complex systems experience phase transitions are difficult to iden-
tify. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] To test the existence of tipping points in financial
markets, based on the alternating offer strategic model we propose a net-
work of bargaining agents[8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] who mutually either co-
operate or compete,[18, 15, 16, 17] where the feedback mechanism[19, 20]
between trading and price dynamics is driven by an external “hidden”
variable R that quantifies the degree of market overpricing. Due to the
feedback mechanism, R fluctuates and oscillates over time, and thus pe-
riods when the market is underpriced and overpriced occur repeatedly.
As the market becomes overpriced, bubbles are created that ultimately
burst in a market crash. The probability that the index will drop in the
next year exhibits a strong hysteresis behavior from which we calculate
the tipping point. The probability distribution function of R has a bi-
modal shape characteristic of small systems near the tipping point. By
examining the S&P500 index we illustrate the applicability of the model
and demonstate that the financial data exhibits a hysteresis and a tipping
point that agree with the model predictions. We report a cointegration
between the returns of the S&P 500 index and its intrinsic value.
1 Introduction
.
Although much network science research has focused on how network col-
lapse occurs when certain internal parameters approach their tipping points,[21]
there is a broad class of real-world complex networks in which the dynamics
are driven by “hidden” external variables[22, 23, 24] in the form of feedback
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mechanisms. The tipping points at which these networks collapse have not yet
been adequately understood. In a buyer/seller financial network the trading
dynamics are strongly affected by trader perceptions that the market is over-
priced or underpriced. In a landlord/renter network a hidden variable is the
ratio between the average apartment price and the average renter income. In a
university/student network a hidden variable is the ratio between the average
tuition and the average family income. In each of these examples, increasing the
ratio increases the probability of network collapse, and our goal is to quantify
the ratio that causes networks to collapse.
Competition
Cooperation
Competition
Information
Price
Figure 1: Competition, cooperation, and feedback mechanism between trading
process and price dynamics in a coupled network model. Inflow of information
determines intrinsic price, a genuine, fundamental information about an asset.
The ratio between market price and intrinsic price affects the trading dynamics
which in turn change the trading pattern.
Here we focus on financial trading markets where the trading decisions made
by the market players are influenced by their expectations about the future.
With the passing of time they learn whether their expectations about future
market behavior were accurate. Overly-optimistic predictions in particular are
very time-limited and are often followed by adjustments in the market price so
abrupt that they cause the market to collapse.
Here we propose a network of bargaining agents and demonstrate how the
degree of market overpricing through a feedback mechanism between trading
and price dynamics induces further market overpricing, market bubbles, and
utimately market collapse[27, 28, 29, 25, 26]. According to Scheinkman a bubble
is a period in which prices exceed fundamental value.[30] We find that a well-
known US financial index, the S&P500 index, exhibits a hysteresis behavior and
a market-collapse tipping point that confirms the predictions of our network
model.
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2 Complex network market model
2.1 Initial Networks.
Because most human activity is limited by the finite availability of resources,
individuals are compelled to bargain over the division of those resources.[8, 18]
Bargaining has been at the core of trade from the earliest recorded human
history when, prior to the introduction of currency, goods and services were
bartered. Today bargaining is ubiquitous and ranges from haggling for food
items in certain cultures to negotiations between large international business
firms.[31, 23, 29] The bottom line in every market is the outcome of the bar-
gaining process, e.g., market price. Although standard axiomatic bargaining
theory idealizes the bargaining problem by assuming that individuals are highly
rational as they negotiate their desires for various resources, panic and irra-
tional behavior[25] do occur in real-world complex systems including political
networks and financial markets. This irrational behavior strongly affects the
bargaining process, affects entire complex network systems, and causes bubbles
and crashes. Irrespective of market trading rules, players use strategic reason-
ing and the information available to them when proposing initial bargaining
prices.[8, 18, 31, 32, 35, 33, 34] For example, someone selling an apartment
needs to know the prices being listed by other sellers of similar apartments in
the same neighborhood before they can list an initial bargaining price for their
own apartment. The seller takes into account that this initial price will prob-
ably be challenged by potential buyers and that bargaining in competion with
other apartment sellers in the neighbor will ensue.
We propose a coupled network model composed of equally sized demand
(buyer) and supply (seller) networks, where agents represented as network nodes,
cooperate with agents on the opposite side of the market,[18] but compete with
agents on the same side of the market, as depicted in Fig. 1. Both demand
(buyer) and supply (seller) networks are initialized with a single node, and new
nodes together with their prices are added one by one until each network has
N nodes. At any given time step and for each demand and supply network the
new node is added as follows:
1. With a constant probability p, a new node vi is added to the already
existing network structure:
• node vi randomly links a node vj , where each j ∈ [1, i− 1] has equal
probability 1/(i− 1) and node vi is then connected to each neighbor
of vj ,
• node vi sets its market (traded) price Si as the arithmetic mean of
all its neighbors’ prices,
Si =
1
ni
∑
k
Sk, (1)
where k runs over all of vi’s neighbors and the size of vi’s neighbor-
hood is ni = nj + 1.
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2. With a probability 1− p a new node vi connects to node e in the current
network, which has the highest/lowest price Se in the buyer/seller network,
and sets its market price Si as a percentage increase/decrease ∆ from Se,
Si = Se · (1 + ∆). (2)
For the limit case p = 0, all the nodes form a chain. In the opposite limit
case p = 1, each new node connects to a node from the existing cluster and all
its neighbors, forming a complete graph. These trivial cases together with the
case p = 0.3 are shown in Fig. 2.
2.2 Bargaining Process.
Once both demand and supply networks are generated, the trading between
buyers and sellers is initiated. Trading and price dynamics are driven by the
inflow of information about an asset, which determines the intrinsic price SI .
In contrast to this relatively stable intrinsic price, the dynamics of which will be
explained below, the market price is volatile. To generate bubbles and crashes
and the feedback mechanism[25] between the trading and price processes, we
use network parameters that are time-dependent, not constant, i.e.,
ps(t) = 1− e
−α
S(t)
SI (t) , pd(t) = 1− e
−α
SI (t)
S(t) (3)
where S(t) is the last traded price at time t. Here α is a parameter controlling
overall network clustering.
Note that Eq. (3) implies that when the market price S(t) greatly exceeds
the intrinsic value SI(t), ps → 1, the competition between supply agents in-
creases, their strategies begin to converge, and their trading prices become in-
creasingly similar (generating the current market price). As a consequence,
supply agents become increasingly insecure about their bargaining position. In
addition, ps → 1 implies pd → 0, which intensifies the market situation because
the demand agents now have more strategic options and face less competition.
This combination of increasing confidence levels in the demand network and de-
creasing confidence levels in the supply network increases the probability that
there will be an abrupt price crash. This is in agreement with Scheinkman and
Xiong who reported that overconfidence generates disagreements among agents
regarding asset fundamentals which then causes a significant bubble component
in asset prices[36].
Demand and supply agents bargain with each other to reach agreements
and execute trades. Here we present a bargaining framework based on the al-
ternating offer strategic model proposed by Rubinstein.[18] Agents are randomly
selected, alternating between the demand and supply networks, to make moves.
A move is either accepting the best current price offered by the other side or
proposing a new price. Each time a trade is executed, the trading agents are
removed from their networks and a new one is added in both demand and sup-
ply network, thus keeping the number of agents N constant. Agents joining the
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Figure 2: Clustered chain networks of competing agents for N = 10, with
p = 0 (chain) and p = 1 (fully connected graph). Clustered chain network of
competing agents for N = 50 and p = 0.3.
network follow the proposed network algorithm but are not allowed to connect
to the first cluster (the neighborhood of the first node). This is due to the fact
that these traders have just bought/sold the asset and believe the price is going
to rise/fall, and thus would not go back into their former position immediately.
After each trade, there is a probability β that the last node from each net-
work will reconnect into the existing network structure following the proposed
algorithm, giving the more ”fundamental” long-term investors the possibility of
changing their position. The utility gained by agent i from trading at price S is
quantified by a monotonic utility function ui(S). Before making a move, agent
i evaluates the possible outcome at two steps τ = {0, 1} using a random utility
function Ui(S, τ),
Ui(S, 0) = ui(S), (4)
Ui(S
′, 1) =
{
ui(S
′), with probability λi
0, with probability 1− λi
(5)
where λi ∈ [0, 1] quantifies “agent confidence,” the probability calculated by
agent i that his/her offer (price S′) will be accepted in the next step at τ = 1.
The expected utility of immediately accepting offer S (at τ = 0) is deterministic
and equal to the agent’s utility function of price S, as noted in Eq. (4). The
expected utility of proposing a new price S′ can be calculated from Eq. (5) as
E[Ui(S
′, 1)] = ui(S
′)λi. (6)
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Agent i accepts the current offer at τ = 0 if the expected utility at τ = 0 is
larger than the expected utility at τ = 1.
Agent i evaluates his/her confidence level λi based on his/her position in
the network, taking into account any available information about trends in the
intrinsic price value. Demand and supply agents evaluate their confidence based
on the probabilities,
λ
(s)
i =
1
1 +
n
(s)
i
n
(d)
0
· e−γrI(t)
λ
(d)
j =
1
1 +
n
(d)
j
n
(s)
0
· eγrI(t)
(7)
where n
(s)
i and n
(d)
j are the neighborhood sizes of supply agent i and demand
agent j, n
(s)
0 , and n
(d)
0 is the neighborhood size of the supply and demand agents
(the best offers), and rI(t) is the proportional change in the intrinsic value. Here
γ is a parameter controlling how much a change in the intrinsic value impacts
the market price. When the intrinsic value is approximately constant then the
agents evaluate their confidence based on their position in the network only.
For supply agent i note that the more competing supply agents n
(s)
i rely on
similar information and have synchronized trading strategies, and the smaller
the number of demand agents n
(d)
0 , the lower the value of λ
(s)
i . More details
regarding utility functions ui(S), new proposed prices S
′, and agent confidence
λi are given in the Methods section. Note that the competition-cooperation
mechanism in trading dynamics in which agents within the same group compete
differs from the mechanisms that drive the evolution of cooperation in which
agents within the same group cooperate.[37]
3 Quantifying the Degree of Market Overpric-
ing
.
In our modelling we were led by the conjecture that market bubbles are
caused by complex cooperation-competition bargaining dynamics and that mar-
ket collapse occurs when the ratio between market price and intrinsic price—
close to the Tobin q ratio and its expansions[38, 39]—reaches a critical (tipping)
point. To calculate this ratio, which quantifies the degree of market overpricing,
we must first estimate the market intrinsic value. Our model for determining the
intrinsic value is based on the widely used free cash flow (FCF) model,[40, 41]
in which the stock of a company is worth the sum of all of its discounted future
free cash flows,[42]
SI(t) =
∞∑
j=1
FCFt+j∏j
k=1 (1 +WACCt+k)
, (8)
and the discount rate is the future weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
Using information about past realizations of FCF and WACC and Eq. 8 we
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Figure 3: Price dynamics. (a) The S&P 500 prices, earnings, and cash flows,
monthly recorded. (b) The S&P 500 index, and the intrinsic value of the S&P
500 index. Both charts are adjusted for inflation. (c) Different time series
of model prices together with the intrinsic value of the S&P 500 index from
January 1920 to March 2015, and the (market) S&P 500 price index.
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determine the intrinsic value SI at some past time t − T . The SI vaue is
approximate because for the t − T time period we know only those FCF and
WACC values from t− T up to time t and thus the FCF and WACC values for
times longer than tmust be estimated. Thus the further back we go (t T ), the
better will be the past price estimate at t−T . Because our goal is to estimate the
current intrinsic value, we use past SI values we estimate the current intrinsic
value and assume that the growth in cash flows is constant and exponential.
For a detailed discussion, see the Methods section. Our model model has two
stages, a volatile growth phase that lasts T years followed by a stable “steady
state” growth phase. We first examine the steady state growth phase where the
ultimate question to be answered is: what are the dynamics that control cash
flow?
To this end, Figure 3(a) shows the time series of Shiller’s monthly recorded
S&P price, S&P earnings, and S&P cash flows, which represent the behavior
of the total US economy for the last 95 years.[43] Note that although the US
economy has radically changed over the last century, with traditional industry
being replaced by advanced technology, both earning levels and cash flows have
on average increased exponentially and the exponential growth rates are ap-
proximately constant. This result indicates that the earning dynamics in the
US economy during the last two decades have been similar to those during the
first two decades of the 20th century. According to Abreu and Brunnermeier[28]
market bubbles are sometimes caused when less sophisticated, overly optimistic
traders believe that some new technological innovation will guarentee perma-
nently higher growth rates. Figure 3(b) also shows the S&P 500 index SM over
the last 95 years together with the intrinsic value of the S&P 500 index, SI ,
obtained using Shiller’s S&P 500 data from January 1920 until March 2014.[43]
Recalling that in our model trader confidence[25] is quantifed by the ratio
between between market price and intrinsic value, Fig. 3(c) shows several realiza-
tions of the model market price. These outputs represent all model outputs for
this intrinsic price input and no other realizations were discarded. When the
market becomes unsustainably overpriced a speculative bubble is created,[25]
which in turn makes the agents increasingly uncertain about current and fu-
ture trading prices. This accumulated collective uncertainity among agents we
quantify as the variance of model price, and Fig. 4(a) shows that the variance
is at its highest levels just before a market crash when market price greatly ex-
ceeds intrinsic value. The accumulated collective uncertainity is further shown
in Fig. 4(b) where decreasing confidence in the supply network quantified by
increasing the average clustering coefficient is followed by increasing confidence
levels in the demand network quantified by decreasing the average clustering
coefficient. The results reported in Fig. 4(a)–(b) are in agreement with a com-
plex system phenomenon called critical slowing down[5] characterized by the
increase in the variance as the system approaches criticality, which is, in our
case, market collapse.
To test how the market and intrinsic prices are related in the long run, Fig-
ure 5(a) shows the ratio between the market S&P 500 index and the intrinsic
value of the S&P 500 index. Although the intrinsic value of the S&P 500 is not
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Figure 4: Early-warning indicator. (a) The scaled variance of model price as
an early-warning indicator. As the market is getting overpriced, the variance of
fluctuations is increasing. (b) Increasing confidence in the demand network is
followed with decreasing confidence levels in the supply network.
calculated by fitting the market index, the average value of the ratio is close to
one (1.04), which is a result that contrasts with the results of a theoretical model
that assumes rational agents who do not know the beliefs of other agents and
the market price is larger than the intrinsic value.[26] Figure 5(a) further vali-
dates our intrinsic price since we find that the peaks of the market-to-intrinsic
ratio follow the peaks of the Shiller P/E indicator widely used to estimate the
degree of market overpricing. This fact affirms that our SI represents a reason-
able estimation of the intrinsic value of the S&P 500 index. Figure 5(a) further
reveals that the periods when the market is underpriced and overpriced occur
repeatedly, which agrees, when speaking of companies, with the suggestion that
expectations for a company should not be too high or too low[44]. If a company
promises investors blue-sky expected outcomes that are not realized, not only
will the share price drop when the market realizes that the company cannot de-
liver, but it may take years for the company to regain credibility. To paraphrase
Abraham Lincoln, by overestimating the market you can fool some of the people
all of the time, but all of the people only some of the time. The final punishment
of the market comes in the ensuing period when the market is underpriced.
We confirm the intriguing possibility that two distinct underpriced and over-
priced modes are present in the financial complex system. Figure 5(b) shows the
probability of the ratio between market price and intrinsic value for the S&P
500 index. We apply a statistical mixture model to reveal the presence of a
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substructure in the ratio and show that the probability distribution function of
the ratio fits the Gaussian mixture model, which resembles the bimodal shape
characteristic for small nonlinear systems near a tipping point.[45] Note that we
can locate this substructure of the financial system with the underpriced and
overpriced modes because we have a model that can estimate the intrinsic price.
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Figure 5: The ratio between the market S&P 500 price index and the estimated
intrinsic value of the S&P 500 index. (a) The ratio we compare with the scaled
Shiller’s P/E (green), the latter obtained by dividing with 20 for the clarity rea-
son. As we note there is a surprising overlap between the peaks. (b) Histogram
of the ratio (in blue) resembles a bimodal functional form, characteristic for
nonlinear phenomena of small systems near the tipping point. The red vertical
line indicates today’s value of the ratio, and the fitted Gaussian mixture model
with two components at µ1 = 0.8 and µ2 = 1.3 is shown in green.
Figure 5(a) suggests that over a long period of time the market price and
the intrinsic value should follow each other. We quantify this assumption by
investigating the long-term relationship[46] between the S&P 500 index, SM (t),
and the intrinsic value of the S&P 500 index, SI(t). Motivated by the finding
of Campbell and Shiller that dividends and the present discounted value of
expected future dividends cointegrate,[46] we next employ the Engle-Granger
cointegration test[48, 47] and report the cointegration relationship
log(SM (t))− log(SI(t)) = 0. (9)
between two series at a 5% confidence level (see Table 2). The test is based on
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Table 1: Phillips-Perron Zt unit root tests of S&P 500 intrinsic value and S&P
500 index price; lag length was set to 8 according to the Stock-Watson method;
5% significance critical value equals -8.025.
Test statistics (intrinsic value) Test statistics (index price)
Levels
0.2645 0.387
First differences
−20.063 −919.714
Table 2: Engle-Granger cointegration test based on PP unit root test of regres-
sion residuals between S&P 500 intrinsic value and S&P 500 index price; lag
length was set to 8 according to the Stock-Watson method.
Test Statistic Critical values Significance levels
−16.642 −20.5032 1%
−14.034 5%
−11.213 10%
a PP unit root test of regression residuals, with 8 lags included in the Newey-
West estimator of the long-run variance (the lag parameter was set to 8 in
accordance with the Stock-Watson method[47] 0.75N
1
3 in whichN is the number
of observations). Details about the test are provided in the Methods section and
in Table 2. Intrinsic value and index price may deviate from each other in the
short run, but in the long run the intrinsic value catches up to the market
realizations. As a consequence of the cointegration, the longer the market is
overvalued, the longer we may expect the market to stay in the undervalued
mode.
4 Tipping Points and Hysteresis.
Estimating the tipping points at which a complex system flips from one state to
another is a major challenge in network science.[1] Modeling bubbles and crashes
in finance, Abreu and Brunnermeier[28] argued that rational arbitrageurs are
aware that the market will eventually collapse, but before it happens they want
to ride the bubble and generate high returns. They indicate that a bubble
bursts when the fraction of speculative traders leaving the market exceeds some
threshold, which is the tipping point in their model. In order to estimate tipping
points in an arbitrary model, we must first identify the model output and the
parameter space within which we search for the tipping point.
We hypothesize that financial crashes occur when a single parameter—the
ratio between market price and intrinsic price—reaches a tipping point, and we
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propose a procedure for estimating tipping points in both network model and
U.S. financial market data. For the model we define the network output at time
t as the fraction of future times within the time interval [t+N∆t] which has a
lower price than the current, where ∆t is the time step and N is an integer. We
generate a large number of simulations, and at any t for each price time series
Si,t we record the traded-to-intrinsic price ratio Ri,t and the information Ii,t,
which indicates what fraction of the future prices are lower than the current
(i.e. S(t+k∆t) < S(t), 1 ≤ k ≤ N). Combining all pairs (Ri,t, Ii,t), Figure 6(a)
shows that the probability of a future price decline versus the ratio R exhibits a
hysteresis behavior. The hysteresis is revealed by analyzing the network model
when it moves from its underpriced to its overpriced phase and vice versa. For
example, when the ratio increases as the market moves into an overpriced phase,
along the lower branch (blue line) the probability that the price will drop during
t + N∆t gradually increases up to some ratio value Rc, where the probability
of price change exhibits an abrupt change. Prior to reaching the tipping point
Rc small increases in ratio induce small increases in the probability of price
decline. Upon reaching the tipping point Rc even small changes in R have a
huge impact on the probability of price decline and can cause the market to
collapse. The tipping point varies beween different simulations—as one would
expect for tipping points in the social sciences—and the value Rc ≈ 1.91± 0.19
is thus an average value. In the upper branch (red line) shown in Fig. 6(a)
when the network moves from the tipping point down to some finite ratio, the
probability of price decline during t + N∆t remains high, ≈ 1. As the ratio
continues to decline, however, the probability drops more rapidly.
As stated above, the tipping point is a stochastic variable and thus not de-
terministic. In models in which a node’s activity is dependent upon the activity
of neighboring nodes, quantified by thresholds as in the Watts model,[49, 50]
we define thresholds to be fixed numbers and the result is well-defined critical
points.[50] However, if we assume that the thresholds are stochastic variables,
the critical points will also be stochastic variables.
Figure 6(a) shows that the hysteresis obtained for the network model agrees
with the hysteresis shown Fig. 6(b) for the U.S. financial market, represented
by the S&P 500. The hysteresis shown in Fig. 6(a) was obtained using a large
number of numerical simulations, but the hysteresis in Fig. 6(b) was obtained by
analyzing the S&P 500 during the 2000 dot-com crash and the 2007 recession.
At any t for the S&P 500—precisely the price time series Si,t—we record the
ratio Rt of the S&P 500 and the information Ii,t indicating what fraction of the
future prices are lower than the current Si,t during t + N∆t. Collecting all of
the pairs (Rt, Ii,t), we calculate for a given R the probability that the price will
decline during the time interval [t + N∆t]. We find that the tipping point at
which the U.S. financial system crashes strongly resembles the tipping point we
obtain by our model shown in Fig. 6(a).
Because theories with predictive power are highly valued in science and in
finance in particular,[51, 52] we calculate future intrinsic values of the S&P
500 by assuming that market earnings and weighted average cost of capital in
the future will follow the historical trends. Specifically we use autoregressive
12
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Figure 6: Hysteresis and critical points of financial networks. (a) Model. Prob-
ability that the price will drop during [t, t + N∆t], where N = 12 and ∆t = 1
month, versus the traded-to-intrinsic price ratio, R, shows a hysteresis behavior.
Approaching a tipping point at Rc ≈ 1.88±0.12, the probability of price decline
exhibits an abrupt change. (b) S&P 500. Probability that the price will drop
during [t, t +N∆t] vs. R. Hysteresis calculated for the S&P 500 index with a
tipping point at Rc ≈ 1.91± 0.19. (c) S&P 500. Probability that the price will
drop during [t, t+N∆t] vs. R (where Intrinsic value without forward correction
is used). Hysteresis calculated for the S&P 500 index with a tipping point at
Rc ≈ 1.9± 0.2.
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Figure 7: Forecasting power. (a) Different time series of model price (in blue),
with the the S&P 500 price index (in green) for the estimated intrinsic values
(in red). (b) Cumulative distribution of potential loss L, P (L < x) (in red),
with cumulative distribution of potential gain G, P (G > x) (in blue) in period
from April 2015 to December 2016.
models to make predictions of earnings and WACC trends. We further generate
a large number of the network realizations, resulting in modeled prices shown
in Figure 7(a), and then we count the modeled prices according to their relative
change with respect to the maximum or minimum value (which ever occurs
earlier) in period from April 2015 to December 2016. Figure 7(a) shows the
cumulative frequencies for the cases with the negative change, i.e. loss (in
red) and cumulative frequencies with the positive change, i.e. gain (in blue).
Figure 7(b) reveals that the probability of S&P 500 declining from its peak for
more than 10% is approximately 80%. The same Figure further reveals that
there is only 20% chance that the S&P 500 index will grow more than 10% from
its minimal value in the same time period. This calculations assumes that the
earning trends and WACC obtained from the historical data will continue to
hold, at least in the near future, and Figure 3 shows that this assumption is
reasonably correct.
5 Conclusion.
In this paper we introduce a model that uses complex network science and
cooperative game theory to generate trading prices based on fundamental in-
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formation. This model assumes that agents compete when they use similar
strategies. Due to the stochasticity of the network model, using the same input
and the same intrinsic value can generate different ouputs, which we can use
to analyze trader confidence. The observed market dynamics show that uncer-
tainty among agents is at its highest level just prior to a market crash when the
bargaining process produces market values that far exceed the intrinsic values.
We hypothesize that the bargaining process around intrinsic values generates
bubbles and market crashes.
The model enables us to understand the nature of financial crises and mar-
ket collapse and thus enhances systemic risk analysis. This will enable us to
develop procedures for avoiding global financial meltdowns. In our network
model crashes occur when the ratio between market price and intrinsic price,
R, reaches a tipping point. We use the hysteresis behavior of the network to
calculate the tipping point. The probability distribution function of R exhibits
a bimodal shape characteristic of small systems near a tipping point. The tip-
ping point before a market crash is not deterministic, and our model can be
used to estimate the time interval within which the market will crash. With
further insight into agent trading behavior and the effects of different parameter
settings, future research will be able to apply our model to the analysis of other
important market phenomena (such as bid-ask spread dynamics).
6 Methods.
In this section we describe the proposed complex bargaining model in detail and
discuss the specifics of the intrinsic price estimation method.
6.1 Complex bargaining
Assume two agents (“players”) are involved in the sale of a book. Player 1 is
selling the book and values it at $60, and player 2 wants to buy the book
and values it at $30. The two players are the only agents involved in the
transaction, both are rational, and both want the transaction to occur (neither
will withdraw). Because there are no other agents who might be competitors and
influence the transaction, the two players rationally meet halfway and agree on a
price of $45. We can make the situation more complex by adding the assumption
that there is a probability 1−λ = 0.8 that either player will quit the bargaining
process before an agreement is reached. In this case each player’s anxiety that
the other will back out of the transaction gives them greater motivation to reach
an agreement. As a result, two equilibrium prices, $35 and $55, emerge. The
seller is assured of $35 without risk but must weigh that against getting $55 with
a probability of λ = 0.2. The seller will accept any price above $35 but will not
offer a price below $55. These described bargaining scenarios are rudimentary,
and for a more detailed discussion see Nash,[8] Rubinstein,[18] and a number of
other contributors.[32, 35]
15
The agent utility functions are linear functions of the offered price that
monotonically increase for supply agents and monotonically decrease for buyer
agents, i.e.,
u
(s)
i (S) =
S − S
(s)
init
S
(s)
i − S
(d)
init
, u
(d)
j (S) =
S
(s)
init − S
s
(s)
init − S
(d)
j
, (10)
where S
(s)
init and S
(d)
init are the initial bargaining prices of the supply and demand
agents (the best supply and demand offers), respectively. These are reset when
a trade occurs and are fixed between trades.
Agents evaluate the utility of accepting S, the offer in the current step, using
U
(s)
i (S, 0) = u
(s)
i (S) , U
(d)
j (S, 0) = u
(d)
j (S). (11)
When evaluating whether to accept an offer in the next bargaining step, an
agent must assess the probability that another trading agent will intervene and
steal the trading opportunity. For all supply and demand agents, the probability
that this “breakdown scenario” (b) will occur is u
(s)
i (b) = u
(d)
j (b) = 0. The utility
of accepting offer S in the next bargaining step is given by
E[U
(s)
i (S, 1)] = u
(s)
i (S)λ
(s)
i + u
(s)
i (b)
(
1− λ
(s)
i
)
= u
(s)
i (x)λ
(s)
i
E[U
(d)
j (S, 1)] = u
(d)
j (xSλ
(d)
j + u
(d)
j (b)
(
1− λ
(d)
j
)
= u
(d)
j (S)λ
(d)
j . (12)
Here λ
(s)
i and λ
(d)
j are the evaluated probabilities (the “agent confidences”) of
the supply agent i and demand agent j, respectively, poised to trade (or not
trade) in the next step. The agents use their neighborhoods to evaluate their
confidence following the expression (7). Since external information affects one
side positively and the other negatively, supply and demand agents interpret
this information reciprocally. In effect, the intrinsic value return rI(t) tilts the
overall confidence evaluations of agents and renders one side more confident and
the other less, and is calculated as
rI(t) =
SI(t)− SI(t− 1)
SI(t− 1)
. (13)
The network parameters used in this study are: α = 0.2, β = 0.3 and γ = 120.
These values were empirically chosen to produce reasonable model outputs.
We use a version of the monotonic concession protocol to simulate agent
price movement during the bargaining process [31]. Agents from the supply and
demand sides alternate in making their moves. A move can either be accepting
the current offer from the other side or proposing a new price. If the offer is
accepted and a trade in completed the trading agents are removed from their
networks and the agreed-upon price becomes the trading price. An agent accepts
the current offer if the expected advantage of accepting it is greater than or equal
to the expected advantage of risking that a more attractive price will be agreed
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upon in the next step. This condition can be expressed using equations (11)
and (12) for supply and demand agents,
E
[
U
(s)
i
(
S
(d)
0 , 0
)]
≥ E
[
U
(s)
i
(
S
(s)
i ·
(
1 + δ
(s)
i
)
, 1
)]
E
[
U
(d)
j
(
S
(s)
0 , 0
)]
≥ E
[
U
(d)
j
(
S
(d)
j ·
(
1 + δ
(j)
d
)
, 1
)]
. (14)
If the condition is not met, the agent proposes a new price, S
(s)
i ← S
(s)
i ·(
1 + δ
(s)
i
)
. The multiplicative concession steps δ
(s)
i for supply and demand
agents are defined
δ
(s)
i = δ
(s)
(
1− λ
(s)
i
)
, δ
(d)
j = δ
(d)
(
1− λ
(d)
j
)
, (15)
where δ(s) ≤ 0 and δ(d) ≥ 0 are fixed concession step constants for the supply and
demand networks, respectively. This means that the magnitude of concession
steps made by agents will be determined by the level of agent confidence. Less
confident agents offer a larger concession step. After a trade occurs and the
trading agents are removed from their networks, a new agent is added to each
network, which preserves the orders of both networks. The new nodes are
added according to the protocol described above, with the probability p defined
in Eq. (3). The parameter values used are pc = 0.2, δ
(d) = −δ(s) = 0.005.
The supply and demand networks each have 500 agents and each are initialized
with a single node with the initial price equal to the initial intrinsic value.
The network steps are ∆(s) = 0.01 and ∆(d) = −0.01 for supply and demand
networks, respectively.
6.2 Intrinsic price estimation
The free cash flow model (FCFM) is one of the most respected methods for de-
termining the intrinsic value of a company. The model assumes that a company’s
stock is equal to the sum of all of its future free cash flows (FCF), discounted
back to their present value using the future weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) as the discount rate (see Eq. (8). FCF is the cash flow generated by
the core operations of the business after deducting investments in new capital,
and WACC is the rate of return that investors expect to earn from investing in
the company. Because investors do not know future values of FCF and WACC,
they use estimates based on their own experience, knowledge, and available in-
formation. To avoid false precision errors, investors often split their forecast
into two periods, (i) a detailed five-year forecast that develops complete balance
sheets and income statements with as many links to real variables as possible,
and (ii) a simplified forecast for the remaining years. The stock is then traded
at a price
S(0) =
T∑
j=1
FCFEj∏j
k=1 (1 +WACC
E
k )
+
CV ET∏T
k=1 (1 +WACC
E
k )
, (16)
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where FCFEj is the estimated FCF at the step j,WACC
E
k the estimated WACC
at time step k, and CV ET the estimated continuing value at time step T . Because
the correct FCF and WACC are known for the previous five years—time period
T—an estimation of a company’s intrinsic value at the beginning of that five-
year time period, SI(−T ), made today will be more accurate than one made
five years ago,
SI(−T ) =
0∑
j=−T+1
FCFj∏j
k=−T+1 (1 +WACCk)
+ (17)
∞∑
j=1
FCFEj∏0
k=−T+1 (1 +WACCk)
∏j
k=1 (1 +WACC
E
k )
.
Although estimates of FCF andWACCmust extend to the indeterminate future,
because of the discount effect these estimates will have a decreasing impact on
the price. For the sake of simplicity, we assume (i) that the future FCF will grow
at a constant growth rate g, and (ii) that the future WACC will be constant.
Therefore (17) becomes
SI(−T ) =
0∑
j=−T+1
FCFj∏j
k=−T+1 (1 +WACCk)
+ (18)
FCF1∏0
k=−T+1 (1 +WACCk)(WACC∞ − g)
,
where FCF1 is the expected FCF one time step in the future (e.g., one year from
now), and WACC∞ the expected long-term WACC. The goal is to estimate the
current intrinsic value of the company now, not its value five years ago. Because
over a long period of time the growth rate of the company earnings will be similar
to its stock prices, we can estimate the current intrinsic value of the company
using
SI(0) = (1 + g)TSI(−T ), (19)
where g is the constant growth rate of earnings. Figure 3(a) shows that this
assumption is reasonable, and Fig. 3(b) shows the intrinsic values with and
without the forward correction from Eq. (19). Based on the ratio between these
two time series, we define the 90% confidence interval, also shown in Fig. 3(b).
Because data for FCF and WACC are usually unavailable, when we imple-
ment and test the model we replace these variables with quantities supplied in
financial databases. FCF is, in the first approximation,
FCF = E−NI, (20)
where E is firm earnings and NI net investments—the increase in invested capital
from one year to the next, i.e., the portion of earnings the firm reinvests. The
investment rate (IR), the portion of earnings invested back into the business, is
IR =
NI
E
. (21)
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The return on invested capital (ROIC) is usually defined as the return a
company earns on each dollar invested in the business. This is approximately
ROIC =
E
Invested Capital
. (22)
Growth (g) is usually defined as the rate at which the company’s earnings grows
each year,
g =
NI
Invested Capital
. (23)
Note that FCF = E(1− IR) and g = ROIC · IR. Finally,
FCF = E
(
1−
g
ROIC
)
. (24)
In FCFM the discount rate is the weighted average cost of capital. In its simplest
form, the weighted average cost of capital is the market-based weighted average
of the after-tax cost of debt and cost of equity,
WACC =
D
D+ E
(1− Tm)kd +
E
D+ E
ke, (25)
where D/(D + E) is the debt-to-value target level, E/(D + E) the equity-to-
value target level, kd the cost of debt, Tm the marginal tax rate, and ke the cost
of equity.
We use data on the S&P 500 from January 1900 to March 2015 supplied by
Robert Shiller when we implement our model. These include data on real (infla-
tion adjusted) earnings, real prices, real long-term interest rates, and S&P500
historical averages (inflation adjusted). The median debt-to-equity ratio for the
S&P500 is 19.7%, the median return on invested capital 7%, and the median
growth rate of earnings g=1.7%. We use the long-term interest rate as a proxy
for the after-tax cost of debt, and the S&P 500 earning yield as a proxy for the
cost of equity. Because the time period is T = 5 years, at each time step the
intrinsic value for the five previous years is determined, and (19) is employed to
determine the intrinsic value at the current time step.
We next use the Engle-Granger cointegration test to investigate the long-
term relationship [46] between S&P500 intrinsic values and S&P500 index prices.
Prior to testing for cointegration, we ensure that both series have the same order
of integration. To determine the order of integration, we employ the Phillips-
Perron Zt (PP) unit root test of the null hypothesis that indicates whether
the variable has a unit root against a stationary alternative. Table 1 shows
the results of PP unit root tests for both levels and the first differences of log-
price series. The results imply that both series contain a unit root in levels
and thus should be first differentiated to achieve stationarity. We conclude that
both series are integrated at the first order, I(1), at a 5% confidence level.
To determine whether there is cointegration between the S&P500 intrinsic log-
value and the index log-price, we employ the Engle-Granger test,[48, 47] which
is based on a PP unit root test of regression residuals, with 8 lags included
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in the Newey-West estimator of the long-run variance (the lag parameter was
set to 8 in accordance with the Stock-Watson method [47] 0.75N
1
3 , where N is
the number of observations). Table 2 shows that the cointegration between the
two series is at a 5% confidence level. Note that intrinsic value and index price
can deviate slightly from each other in the short term, but that market forces,
government policies, and investor behavior bring them back to a equilibrium in
which market realizations and our market expectations converge.
Because theories with predictive power are highly valued in science we calcu-
late future intrinsic values of the S&P 500 by assuming that market earnings and
WACC in the future will follow the historical trends. Specifically we use AR(5)
model with constant term to make prediction of earnings trend and AR(2) model
with constant term to make prediction of WACC trend. Historical earnings and
WACC are used for estimation of the models and Akaike information criterion
is used for lag order selection in both cases. The fitted models are used in sim-
ulation of many possible estimates of the future intrinsic values. We then use
these estimates to predict the future market performance.
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